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Abstract 
This study investigated the psychometric risk perception between lay people and security practitioners towards terrorist 
attack against Singaporean educational institutions. Being located in Southeast Asia, Singapore is not immune to 
terrorist attacks from rebels found in the region. To promote fear and chaos, terrorists have begun to attack private and 
neutral institutions in order to promote their cause. Mosques, hospitals and other such institutions are no longer 
immune from terrorist attacks. The psychometric risk paradigm offers a basis for examining empirical views towards 
potential terrorist attack against such institutions. Survey data in comparing terrorist attack against Singapore’s 
educational institutions with five other criminal activities were collected from two cohorts of 100 college students 
(considered as lay people) and 100 security practitioners. The study demonstrated that the students had a higher risk 
perception when compared to the security practitioners that terrorist attack against educational institutions in 
Singapore could occur, resulting in increased levels of dread and reduced feelings of control. Findings from the study 
supported previous studies that, in particular, there are differences between lay and practitioners views of risk, with 
practitioners’ generally rating risk lower than lay people. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre Twin Towers in New York on the 11th September, 2001, 
indicates that today terrorists’ strategies, motivations, objectives, modus operandi and targeting have 
radically changed. In particular, the pervasive use of suicide bombings against innocent civilians, in 
advancing their multifaceted cause. Soft sites appear to be targets of attacks, as seen in recent years 
educational institutions are not spared from these attacks. From day-care centres to universities, all have the 
potential to be targeted by terrorist (Dorn & Dorn, 2006, p. 31). 
 
In order for policy makers to apply appropriate security mitigation strategies, understanding risk perception is 
important. Everyone in their daily lives is exposed to risk and how people perceive risk, results to some degree in their 
decisions-making. People are generally less acceptable of risk if it is imposed by external factors over which they have 
no control. Several studies (Siegrist, Cvetkovich & Roth, 2000; Siegrist, 2000) have shown that understanding of 
people’s perceptions of risk is important in order to make sound policy decisions. 
 
The study analysed the understanding of the public’s risk perception on terrorist attack against educational institutions 
located in Singapore, with the use of the psychometric risk as the theoretical framework. The study observed whether 
risk perception differed between the two selected cohorts, defined as lay people and security practitioners. Such 
information may assist government, security industry and academia to better understand the risk perception of their 
citizens, resulting in more suitable communication to the public. 
 
In the study, the following Research Questions were considered: 
1. What are the risk perceptions of Singaporeans regarding terrorist attack against educational institution? 
2. Are there any significant differences in risk perceptions between the students and security personnel? 
 
PERCEPTION OF TERRORISM 
There have been a number of international surveys involving perceptions of terrorism risk. Burns (2007) presented eight 
US studies relevant to the threat of terrorism. One of these asked respondents how likely and serious certain types of 
terrorist attacks may appear, for example airline hijacking, attack on public transportation, deliberate contamination of 
the food supply and release of a chemical or biological agent. The findings revealed that the respondents have 
substantial concerns about future terrorist attacks and that they would be willing to support policies that commit 
considerable resources to prevent future attack. 
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Holmberg and Weibull (2002) surveyed the Swedish population, finding that terrorism was the third most worrying 
threat. Another Swedish study by Bennulf (cited in Sjöberg, 2004) asked about worry and found terrorism ranked third. 
In that study, all the threats and hazards were concerned with violence and various life-threatening hazards, with no 
economic risks or other social risks mentioned. Nevertheless, Sjöberg (2004) found that in a study by Stutz (2002) 
demonstrated that the high level of perceived threat from terrorism among the Swedish public a year earlier had faded. 
 
On 7th May 2009, the Singapore Today newspaper (Yeo, 2009) published a poll of 100 Singaporeans on “how 
concerned are you that a terrorist attack ... will happen in Singapore.” The Poll revealed that 52% expressed extreme 
concern or concern, while 33% expressed unconcerned or were extremely unconcerned that a terrorist attack will 
happen in Singapore. Such results appeared to indicate that Singaporeans were aware that they could be exposed to a 
terrorist attack. In the same news article it was highlighted that although Singaporeans had not experienced any major 
incidents, they were aware of the security threats around them due to the awareness instilled in them by Government 
(Yeo, 2009). It is important to note that terrorism’s future orientation highlights the importance of understanding how 
people respond to threats, as well as to actual incidents. The psychological study of risk provides insight into how 
people may react to the threat of terrorism (Jenkin, 2006).  
 
PSYCHOMETRIC RISK 
Psychometric theory of risk is a quantitative methodology of the study of human behaviour (Brooks, 2003, p. 20). It was 
Slovic (1992) who developed a method, which was termed the psychometric paradigm to study the risk perception of 
risk to certain activities and technologies. The origin of the psychometric paradigm is the expressed preferences 
approach developed by Starr (1969), which was developed as a method of weighting technological risks against 
benefits. 
 
Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read and Combs (1978) proposed a psychometric model of risk perception that initiated 
the psychometric risk paradigm. The authors compiled nine dimensions and asked people to rate the risk of 30 activities 
on each of the two dimensions. The nine dimensions were (1) voluntariness, (2) immediacy, (3) know to exposed, (4) 
known to science, (5) controllability, (6) newness, (7) chronic, (8) common/dread, and (9) severity of consequences. 
This psychometric research approach “has been used to study a broad range of hazards, including technological risks, 
activities, and food hazards” (Siegrist, Keller, Kastenholz, Frey & Wiek, 2007, p. 60). 
 
As explained by Brooks (2003, p. 40), the construct of risk perception may be measured by two risk factors, being the 
sense of dread and the sense of familiarity. The measure of each factor defined the perceived level of perceived risk 
towards certain activities or technologies (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1 Psychometric risk perception factor model 
(Brooks, 2003, p. 40) 
 
Through factor analysis, the two factors familiarity of risk and dread risk presented the underlying pattern of inter-
correlations among the judged variables (Figure 2). Such studies (Slovic & Webb, 2002) exhibited the two factor 
analytical representation of 81 different activities and technologies, with factor one axis being defined as low dread risk 
to high dread risk while factor two axes being defined as unfamiliar risk to familiar risk.  
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Figure 2 Psychometric paradigm: spatial locality of 81 hazards 
(Revised from Slovic & Weber, 2002, p. 11) 
 
The two risk factors can be further expanded into the 18 characteristics of risk; however, for the purpose of this study, 
only nine of the 18 risk characteristics were tested (Table 1). 
 
Factor 2 – Dread risk Factor 2 – Familiar risk 
Low dread Dread Familiar Unfamiliar 
Controllable Uncontrollable Know to those exposed Unknown to those exposed 
Increasing Decreasing Old risk New risk
Individual Catastrophic Effect immediate Effect delay 
Voluntary Involuntary  
 
Table 1 The study’s nine measured characteristics 
(Revised from Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 2000, p. 142) 
 
Although psychometric risk has been successfully applied to single hazards, Slovic (1987) cautioned against 
representing complex events as a single homogenous data point. While terrorism has been considered as a single hazard 
in previous psychometric studies, the complexity and relevance of terrorism in today’s society merits an empirical 
exploration of terrorism (Jenkin, 2006). 
 
Layman and expert differences 
Psychometric studies have shown that “perceived risk is quantifiable and predictable” and the “psychometric techniques 
seem well suited for identifying similarities and differences among groups with regard to perception and attitudes” 
(Slovic, 2000, p. 223). Therefore, the concept of risk is subjective and means different things to different people. One of 
the most significant findings within the psychometric paradigm is how lay people and experts distinguish between 
perceived and actual risk. “There is a mismatch in perception between the layperson and the industry expert” (Brooks, 
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2003, p. 21). Experts — and, consequently the policymakers who ask for expert advice — based their risk ratings on the 
expected number of fatalities. Lay people, in contrast, have a richer definition of risk (Marris, Langford, Saunderson & 
O’Riordan, 1997, p. 303) and consider a heuristic approach.  
 
“The way people perceive risk, or risk perception, can be characterized as a battleground of strong and conflicting 
views” (Slovic, 1992, p. 54). As a result, conflicts may occur over the different definitions of risk concepts held by lay 
people and experts. Slovic (cited in Jenkin, 2006) explained such a discrepancy by concluding that experts view risk as 
the likelihood of actual harm based on mortality estimates, whereas lay perceptions of risk are based on a number of 
qualitative (and subjective) characteristics (p. 2). 
 
STUDY DESIGN 
A convenience sampling of students (n=100) and security practitioners (n=100) participated in the survey, which 
comprised of two parts. In the first part, the participants were asked to provide some demographic information, such as 
age, gender and occupation. In the second part, the nine risk perception characteristics (Table 1) were developed into 
questions and the participants asked to indicate their risk perceptions, based on the seven-point semantic differential 
scale (Figure 3). Five criminal activities, namely murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, rioting and burglary, together 
with terrorist attack against an educational institution were listed. Participants were asked to indicate their level of risk 
perception by marking the scale position. 
 
Criminal Activity 1  - Murder 
Low Dread 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High Dread 
Criminal Activity 2  - Kidnapping 
Low Dread 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High Dread 
Criminal Activity 3  - Armed Robbery 
Low Dread 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High Dread 
Criminal Activity 4  - Rioting 
Low Dread 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High Dread 
Criminal Activity 5  - Burglary (house breaking) 
Low Dread 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High Dread 
Criminal Activity 6  - Terrorist attack against educational institution 
Low Dread 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High Dread 
 
Figure 3 Survey questionnaire using the risk characteristics 
 
Target population 
For this study, the study considered lay people and security practitioners who lived in Singapore and were ≥16 years old 
at the time of the survey. The sample population of lay people (n=100) were junior college students. Junior college 
students are post secondary students mainly in the age group of 18 to 19 years old preparing for the GCE ‘A’ levels 
examinations after two years of pre-university studies. The sample for security practitioners (n=100) consisted of full 
time qualified security personnel from local security agencies. Security personnel were chosen, as they have some 
cognisance and training in the area of terrorism and criminal activities. A particular security agency was selected for 
data collection, as all security personnel in Singapore have to undergo the Singapore Workforce Skills Qualification in 
security and thus there is some confidence that the sample accurately represented the security population. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Data were analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) package. Descriptive statistics were 
generated to provide a risk profile for each of the sample cohorts, with independent t-test conducted to determine 
significance of the various risk perceptions. 
 
Risk characteristics 
The mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) for each of the risk characteristics were calculated (Table 2) by averaging all 
respondents (N=200) for the six criminal activities. 
 
Characteristic Murder Kidnapping Armed Robbery Rioting Burglary Terrorist 
Attack
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Dread 
Control 
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Table 2 Mean and standard deviation of the risk characteristics for each activity 
 
These results (Table 2) revealed that the respondents perceived that a terrorist attack against an educational institution 
would make them experience the greatest amount of dread (M=5.33) when compared to the other activities. Rioting, 
however, would lead to the least amount of dread (M=4.19). As for the control over risk, the respondents indicated that 
during a terrorist attack, they would not be able to avoid death or injuries (M=4.77). Burglary (M = 3.17), on the other 
hand, were comparatively more controllable. 
 
The respondents felt that the risk of all six criminal activities were in the neutral range (3.62 <M<4.30); however, a 
terrorist attack (M=6.09) was found to be catastrophic. Terrorist attack (M=5.70) and murder (M=5.51) were considered 
as having very severe consequence, while burglary (M=3.56) was seen as having the least consequence. Murder, 
kidnapping, armed robbery, rioting and burglary were considered old types of risk (2.49<M<3.04), while terrorist attack 
against an educational institution was considered a newer type of risk (M=5.28). 
 
Two-dimensional spatial factor representation 
A two-factor space dread and familiarity graph for the two participating cohorts (Figure 4) was plotted by averaging the 
means of the risk characteristics. Factor 1 dread are risks which are increasingly judged to be less controllable, 
increasing, more catastrophic and more involuntarily as you move from left to right of the graph. Factor 2 familiarity 
risks judged to be known, an old risk and having immediate effect. 
 
 
Figure 4 Risk perception map for student and security personnel 
 
Both cohorts indicated similar spatial results, with the students showing slightly higher unfamiliarity of risk and higher 
dread risk for each of the activities than the security personnel. Nevertheless for terrorism, students indicated a 
significant higher dread and greater unfamiliarity to risk when compared to the security practitioners. For example, 
students had a significantly higher mean control over risk score (M=4.45) than the security personnel (M=3.67; 
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personnel (M=4.45; t(198)=2.844, p=.005). On the other hand, the students had a significantly lower mean of risk score 
(M=3.81) than the security personnel (M=4.25; t(198)=-2.773, p=.006). 
 
The findings (Table 3) indicated that the students had significantly higher mean scores than the security personnel in all 
activities. The student score for Murder (M=4.12) was higher than the security personnel (M=3.88; t(198)=2.374, 
p=.019). Students also had a significantly higher mean kidnapping score (M=3.96) than the group of security personnel 
(M=3.73; t(198)=2.044, p=.042). As for the terrorist attack, the students had a significantly higher mean terrorist attack 
score (M=4.70) than the security personnel (M=4.45; t(198)=2.725, p=.007). 
 
Activity Student 
(N = 100) 
Security practitioner 
(N = 100) 

































Table 3 Activity ratings across cohorts 
 
The alpha coefficient for the 10 risk characteristics (Table 4) were moderate (0.695 to 0.886). According to Cohen, et 
al. (2007, p. 506), these values indicated that the questionnaire was reliable and within the context of the study, for 
measuring the risk characteristics and the overall perceived risk. 
 
Risk Characteristic Alpha 
Dread 
Control over risk 
Decrease vs. increase of risk 
Individual vs. catastrophic 
Voluntary vs. involuntary 
Knowledge about risk 
Severity of consequences 
Old vs. new risk 














Table 4 Internal coefficient Alpha for risk characteristics (n=200) 
 
THE PSYCHOMETRIC RISK MEASURE OF TERRORISM 
The investigation describes the risk perceptions of lay people (student) and security practitioners (security personnel 
working in the security fraternity) regarding terrorist attack against Singaporean educational institutions. This measure 
was achieved by comparing the perceived risk of a terrorist attack against five other criminal activities, namely murder, 
kidnapping, armed robbery, rioting and burglary (house breaking). 
 
Risk perception of terrorist attack against educational institution 
The first Research Question was designed to determine the risk perceptions of Singaporeans regarding terrorist attack 
against educational institution. The findings of this study suggested that risk was perceived differently among the six 
selected criminal activities. Therefore the participants perceived each criminal activity differently, perhaps as expected 
that some criminal activities were perceived as riskier than others. 
 
In the two-dimensional spatial factor representation (Figure 4), two factors labelled as factor 1 dread risk and factor 2 
familiar risk were used to describe the perceptions of the whole sample regarding a terrorist attack against educational 
institution against the other five criminal activities. For terrorist attacks dread risk was measured as high, resulting in a 
perceived dread, lack of control, more catastrophic outcome and that exposure to such attacks mat perceived as 
involuntarily. In addition, the perceived risk of terror attacks in the factor unfamiliar risk was measured as high, judged 
to be an unfamiliar risk, unknown and a new risk, and that any effect may be delayed. Terrorist attack against an 
educational institution was the only activity that scored higher than the neutral rating. It can thus be interpreted that 
Singaporeans judged the risk of a terrorist attack against educational institution as a high dread risk and an unfamiliar 
risk. 
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Differences in the risk perception of terrorist attacks 
The second Research Question was designed to determine whether there were any significant differences in the risk 
perceptions between student (laypeople) and security personnel. Based on the findings (see Table 3), the study 
concluded that risk perceptions differed significantly across students and security personnel in the area of risk control, 
knowledge about the risk and the severity of risk consequences. However, risk perceptions did not differ significantly 
across the two occupations for the dread or voluntariness of risk and whether the risk was old or new risk. 
 
The study was able to conclude that the student perceived that the risk of a terrorist attack against an educational 
institution was greater than that felt by the security personnel. This result concludes that the practitioners, in general, 
rate risk lower than lay people, a view supported by past studies (Krause, Malmfors & Slovic, 1992; Barke & Jenkins-
Smith, 1993; Slovic, Malmfors, Krewski, Mertz, Neil & Bartlett, 1995; Lazo, Kinnell & Fisher, 2000; Gutteling & 
Kuttschreuter, 2002). As Breakwell (2007, p. 71) concludes, there are substantial differences between lay and expert 
views of risk, with experts generally rating risks lower. 
 
The key result in this study indicated that although terrorist attacks against educational institution fall in the high dread 
and unfamiliar risk quadrant, the mean score remained fairly close to the neutral point. This suggests that Singaporeans 
perceived a fairly neutral sense of riskiness and concern that an attack by terrorist on educational institution could 
occur. Such mentality could be due to the perception that Singapore is a relatively safe and orderly country, with low 
crime rates when compared to the other neighbouring countries. Singapore has also been spared from the direct 
experiences of terrorism that neighbouring countries like Indonesia and Philippines have had. In addition, that the 
Singapore Government is perceived to be highly regarded as efficient and capable with various law enforcement 
agencies having high trust level from the members of the public in preventing such incidents. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The study has demonstrated that the perception of a terrorist attack in Singapore is high, when compared against the 
other measured risks. It is therefore pertinent to derive an effective risk communication strategy, devoting resources in 
engaging the public in risk dialogue so that they are more aware of such risks. Government agencies dealing with 
security risk management must know that they cannot properly reduce risk without first understanding how risk may be 
perceived. For the terrorists, mass killings and damage to property are only one-part of a larger plan to intimidate and 
paralyse the populace. Although each terrorist attack instils fear and intimidation, terrorists achieve some of their goals 
of psychological impact through the threat of future attacks, rather than solely through attacks that have already 
occurred. Although there has not been any terrorist attack against Singaporean educational institutions, it is still 
important to understand how people perceived the threat of terrorism, so that policy-makers are better able to develop 
national multi-layered defences against such risk. 
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